THE 30th anniversary of Edsa revolution was greeted by many with indifference. For them, much of the promises that it was supposed to engender, particularly the change in the distribution of power, were not accomplished. One set of oligarchs simply replaced another set of oligarchs. It is for this reason that the campaign of Sen. Ferdinand Marcos Jr. for the vice presidency seem to be flourishing. His constituents apparently believe that his set of oligarchs is better than the current set of oligarchs.
Underlying all of this is the continued lack of effective institutions that could have brought the country closer to a more inclusive society. Much of the government remained unchanged as the same people from the martial law period, tightly held on to their reins of power. Consequently, the members of the Marcos family now hold prominent government positions.
So how do institutions change? The works of Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson point out that, from time to time, changes occur when exceptional events give power to certain groups in society to do so. In the case of Edsa I, the series of events started with the assassination of Sen. Benigno Simeon S. Aquino Jr. and its adversarial aftermath of the event. At that time, civil society had been disorganized most of the time, but during that crisis, was able to unite and have the strength to overthrow the existing regime. The ability of social groups to organize, thus, depends partly on particular situations that make collective or unified action necessary.
Several points need to be stressed in this framework. First, dictatorships tend to systematically repress the collective action of those not in power. In contrast, a democracy provides an institutional framework for the large majority of the people, especially the poor, to solve their collective action problem via political competition and elections. This is partly why elections are such major struggles between extreme forces in this society. For the poor, it represents a potential source of institutional change that could maintain the momentum of exceptional moments, such as, for instance, genuine governance reforms, in which the collective action problem could be solved momentarily.
For the rich, however, the elections can be a way to commit to redistributive transfers toward the poor while avoiding a revolution. Hence, as one can perceive in the current election process, people who have vested interest in the status quo are running for office and promising all sorts of programs for the poor, without the intention of relinquishing their family’s wealth and high positions.
Second, inefficient institutions may survive for a long time because groups with stakes in institutional change fail to get organized and solve their collective action problem. However, collective action problems are not necessarily the only reason for the persistence of inefficient institutions. Acemoglu and Robinson have emphasized the so-called commitment problem: Governments in general falter to undertake change, since there is usually not an external party to enforce agreements between various groups in society. Because of weak governance, whatever group holds power will use that power in its own best interest. Thus, ruling elites who have vested interest in maintaining their power in societies with inefficient institutions may not agree to give up that power because the winners of institutional change may not be able to commit to compensation schemes for the losers in both the legal and economic systems. Inefficient institutions may, therefore, persist because of the combined effect of social conflict and lack of commitment.
An example is the current Aquino administration in relation to the previous Arroyo administration. In the latter, the elite remained purely entrenched in their own jurisdictions and wealth, especially in the agricultural sector, because the economy was not growing enough to offer other feasible alternatives. Genuine reform, including industrial change, was seen as a threat to their power, and agriculture was lucrative enough to justify their activities in that sector. In the Aquino administration, by contrast, the anti-
corruption programs had deeply shaken the powers of the certain strong political entities, and while governance remained weak, the upsurge in both the industrial and service sectors caused the elite to penetrate both of these sectors, arguably leaving much of the agriculture in disarray. Clearly, for the next administration, there is a need to sustain these efforts in order to create room for social mobility, and to help poor farmers in agriculture, especially those in the cooperative movements and civil-society organizations, to consolidate their hold on their resources, especially those that have been newly acquired.
Third, dictatorial institutions have the potential for decisive, centralized decisional changes in large steps. In this sense, they lead to fast-moving institutions, which, nevertheless, change nearly overnight when there are revolutionary moments. In contrast, democratic systems are more often a rationale for slow-moving institutions, but are not readily altered. In fact, Marcos had to undertake a series of steps across certain years before he can impose martial law, while the Edsa revolution only took five days. This makes sense since dictators base their decisions on their own personal interests and perceptions. In contrast, democratic systems have to take a long arduous process of negotiations and renegotiations before decisions are made, ensuring that everyone’s rights are protected. The end result should then be a more unequal distribution of wealth in the period of dictatorships. Income inequality, in fact, grew during the era of martial law, as the 60 percent of the population, belonging to the lower-income classes, were able to obtain only 22.5 percent of the income in 1980, down from 25 percent in 1970. Today this 60 percent of the population with lower income now owns roughly 24 percent of the national income. While the changes may be slight, the elimination of the dictatorship had averted at least the continued increase in inequality.
The takeaway message is that the next elections have a significant effect on the way we celebrate the succeeding anniversaries of the Edsa revolution. Never again should we be fooled by people whose sole interest is only to maintain their control of power and wealth.
Unwillingness to accept gross errors in the past, particularly the widespread unrest and social iniquities, is a clear indication of this selfish intention. Instead, we should use this election to vote for individuals who can provide more opportunities for collective action and social mobility. In this way, more inclusive institutions can emerge.
Leonardo Lanzona Jr. is director at the Ateneo Center for Economic Research and Development and a senior fellow of Eagle Watch, the school’s macroeconomic research and forecasting unit.
1 comment
I thought this article is all about studying the social science of how the “Institution changes” but dude! the content of your article has bias perspective. but thanks for your effort of writing this article .