Having spent a big part of my professional career in the coconut industry, I am privy to some government policy reforms that had underlying impact on the coconut industry, most especially the Coconut Levy Fund under PD 276 dubbed Coconut Consumer Stabilization Fund (CCSF).
Here are the factual clarifications of the following statements that saw print in one of the country’s major dailies on June 18, 2020 that I find to be inaccurate:
1. That President Corazon Aquino asked the PCGG to run after the ill-gotten wealth of Marcos and his cronies including the stake of Cojuangco in San Miguel Corp. (SMC).
Truth: The above statement is correct. However, inadvertently or advertently, they omitted the fact that the Supreme Court already ruled in favor of Cojuangco. In Republic of the Philippines vs. Sandiganbayan GR 166859, the Supreme Court affirmed the Sandiganbayan ruling that the block of shares in SMC in the name of respondent Eduardo Cojuangco is the exclusive property of Cojuangco.
2. That upon the proposal of then Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, Marcos imposed taxes which they called Coco levy on the production of coconut, the proceeds of which were supposed to fund the coconut industry’s development.
Truth: The Coco levy, used to subsidize the millions of consumers buying coconut-oil based products, was instituted under PD 276 entitled Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund (CCSF). The objective is to prevent the spiraling of prices of coconut oil-based products in the Philippines for Filipino consumers, through a subsidy mechanism. (Those who are interested to know how the levy was collected and disbursed can write to the undersigned).
3. That Marcos tapped Cojuangco to administer the funds, but the coconut farmers contend that he funneled the money to set up a bank.
Truth: The Coco levy fund under PD 276 was formulated and managed by the private sector, the United Coconut Associations of the Philippines, which held office in Ermita, Manila.
The Coconut Consumers Stabilization Committee created by PD 276 was composed of the late Jose “Pepot” Eleazar of Cocofed, myself as head of the Coconut Oil Refiners Association, and the representative of then President Ferdinand E. Marcos to the coconut industry, the late General Gregorio Fider, among others.
However, all the documents and equipment of CCSF in its Ermita office were moved to the Philippine Coconut Authority office in three military 6 x 6 trucks upon the instigation of PCA assigned Military supervisor Col.
Rodrigo Gutang, saying that CCSF was part of the government. At that time, Cojuangco was not even known yet in the coconut industry.
On the comment of the farmers that this was used by Cojuangco to buy the bank, they must be referring to RA 6260 which was passed by Congress prior to PD 276, authorizing the Cocofed to collect levy in exchange for a coco-fund receipt, with the aim of raising P100 million to finance the creation of a financial institution for the coconut farmers.
4. That when Cojuangco returned from exile, he expanded SMC by buying the local Coca-Cola franchise;
Truth: Coca-Cola was part of San Miguel Corp. and when Cojuangco returned to the Philippines, it was sold by San Miguel. Hence, today, it’s no longer part of SMC.
As a backgrounder, in 1973 there was a shortage of fats and oil in the world market that drove prices up. As a consequence, this created a shortage of coconut oil based products in the domestic market, prompting then Minister of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile to call for a meeting with all coconut industry leaders at Camp Aguinaldo.
That meeting was also attended by then Trade Secretary Troadio Quiazon Jr., then PNP Chief General Fidel V. Ramos, Agriculture Undersecretary Jose Drilon and Undersecretary Collantes among others. Enrile asked us why there was a shortage of coconut oil based products in the country, even as he also asked why only the pint-size cooking oil was under price control.
In response to Enrile’s question, I explained that under the socialized pricing mechanism, the pint-size cooking oil, which is consumed by the lower income group, could easily be subsidized by the bigger sizes that are consumed by the more affluent consumers. Thereafter, Enrile asked Quiazon to place all sizes of cooking oil under price control.
With that, Enrile announced that we will meet again after 72 hours and he expects the coconut sector to come up with a solution to the shortage problem, even as he also told us that if we cannot find a solution, he will ban the export of copra.
When we were about to leave the hall, Ramos stood up and said, “Gentlemen, if you come back after 72 hours and you don’t have a solution to the problem, you have to turn to the right and the right is the stockade.”
Ramos’ words sent shivers to us since it was barely a year and a half after the declaration of Martial Law in the country.
Having heard that, Drilon said, “Maselan na itong usapan” (This is a sensitive topic), then he invited our group to proceed to his office at the Agriculture Department to discuss the possible solution to the problem. And after thorough discussions, the group agreed that since 80 percent of the country’s production of coconut is exported and enjoying windfall profits, it can easily subsidize the 20 percent in the domestic market.
After the meeting with Drilon, there was no subsequent meeting at Camp Aguinaldo. And thereafter, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued PD 276.
Dr. Jesus Lim Arranza is the chairman of the Federation of Philippine Industries and Fight Illicit Trade; a broad-based, multisectoral movement intended to protect consumers, safeguard government revenues and shield legitimate industries from the ill effects of smuggling.