Just imagine: What if the Islamic State (IS) were not crumbling under Iraqi and Syrian attacks, backed by Western and Russian warplanes, but have established a caliphate with the most powerful military in the Middle East? And what if IS then moved most of its navy to the region, to support Islamic separatists in Mindanao?
What would the Philippines do? Would it be justified in building up naval forces, deploying them in surrounding waters, and constructing airfields with antiaircraft and antiship missiles on the high seas, including disputed waters, shoals and islets?
Now, instead of an imaginary IS strategy, think of the United States “Pivot To Asia” plan, announced five years ago, to move 60 percent of US naval assets, including nuclear-armed vessels, submarines, aircraft and missiles, to East Asia.
These forces could then more quickly deploy and engage hostiles if there are threats and conflicts in the region, including possible war over Taiwan, South Korea, Japan and the Philippines—all under Washington’s security umbrella. Maybe even Vietnam.
What would China do? Would it be justified in building up naval forces, deploying them in surrounding waters, and constructing airfields with anti-aircraft and antiship missiles on the high seas, including disputed waters, shoals and islets?
The China-bully syndrome
The blind spot, or rather the dark cavern, in most Western articles and analyses of regional security is the failure to take full account of China’s security needs. The prevailing narrative tells of this
giant dragon intimidating all Asia, with America as the white knight protecting distressed damsels all around.
So, when Washington’s Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) came out last week with another of its Maritime Transparency Initiative reports on military-capable Chinese facilities on reclaimed islands in the South China Sea, a chorus of alarm promptly rose among regional media and
security wonks.
The overarching view, it seems, is that China has no legitimate security reason to deploy forces on the high seas. Hence, runways, missile bays, marine docks and other military-capable facilities are there just to cow neighboring countries, threatening shipping and even fishermen.
Last week CSIS particularly warned the Philippines about antenna arrays facing Palawan, First Thomas Shoal and Reed Bank (Ayungin Shoal and Recto Bank to Filipinos). Once operational, the system can monitor maritime movements in those territories held by the country.
There were also recent fears among Western analysts over Chinese rockets on Fiery Cross Reef, which got Beijing-wary figures in Manila also fretting. It turned out the rockets were meant to deter frogmen, which Vietnam deployed in China-held islands in the Paracels.
That may well be what the antenna arrays are also supposed to counter, along with other possible intruders, which may well come from the Philippines, given US Navy rotations in the country under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement.
In sum, even as China’s neighbors have reason to fret over its military deployment in the South China Sea, in assessing Chinese actions, a full, impartial analysis should also consider what threats Beijing and its People’s Liberation Army (PLA) must guard against.
What worries the PLA
Even excluding American forces outside Asia, whose firepower and technological prowess far exceed the PLA’s, the Seventh Fleet and other US military units in the region already pack an immensely devastating punch.
That’s the assessment of no less than the US Army-funded RAND think-tank. Its August 2016 report, “War With China: Thinking Through the Unthinkable”, sponsored by the US Undersecretary for the Army, stated: “Both [the US and China] have large concentrations of military forces operating in close proximity. If an incident occurred or a crisis overheated, both have an incentive to strike enemy forces before being struck by them.”
The report authors, David Gompert, Astrid Cevallos and Cristina Garafola, added: “Sensors, weapon guidance, digital networking and other information technologies used to target opposing forces have advanced to the point where both US and Chinese military forces seriously threaten each other. This creates the means, as well as the incentive to strike enemy forces before they strike one’s own.”
Among the biggest PLA worries are hundreds of nuclear-capable cruise missiles, which can hit most of China and all its surrounding waters, launched by ships, subs and planes in the Philippines. No wonder the RAND report cites “aircraft carriers and regional air bases” as prime PLA targets.
All shipping is vulnerable, including tankers carrying four-fifths of Beijing’s oil imports passing through the South China Sea. And the US will target them if it follows by one strategy urged by the RAND report, “Cutting off Chinese access to seaborne supplies of oil and liquefied natural gas.”
So, next time you read some Western expert warning about Chinese military moves, spare a thought for the PLA analysts kept awake by American aircraft carriers, nuclear subs and fighter squadrons bristling with missiles, pivoting to Asia.