EVERY now and then, we excuse ourselves from discussing insurance matters to tackle issues relating to national concerns. Besides, both subjects serve the interest of the public-at-large. Today, we tackle the Doctrine of Condonation in administrative law.
This doctrine has recently been brought to the fore when Makati Mayor Junjun Binay used it as an argument to secure an injunction order from the Court of Appeals against the preventive suspension order issued by the Ombudsman.
We shall explain this condonation by reelection as it is established in jurisprudence, with no political leaning or bias.
Pursuant to the 1992 case of Aguinaldo v Santos, a public official cannot be removed for misconduct committed during a prior or previous term; his reelection operates as a condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct, reiterated in Malinao v Reyes, 1996 (see Provincial Board of Zamboanga del Norte v Guzman, 1967). This Aguinaldo ruling was based on the fact that the term of office during which the misconduct was committed expired before the petition questioning the validity of the administrative decision removing the respondent could be decided (see Reyes v Comelec).
Reyes v Comelec explains the rationale: If a public official is not removed before his term of office expires, he can no longer be removed if he is thereafter reelected for another term. Removal cannot extend beyond the term during which the alleged misconduct was committed.
The doctrine of condonation is a limited empowerment of the electorate over the accountabilities of their elective local officials. It is limited because it does not cover criminal accountabilities. It is a legal fiction grounded upon a presumed knowledge of all the activities and behavior of the elective local official. It is presumed that when the electorate exercised their right to choose, they were all aware of “all” the misconducts of the public official.
Reelection is the manifestation of the people’s will. The rationale for this condonation doctrine was provided by American authorities, specifically the 1887 case of Conant v Brogan, which has found unwavering adoption in Philippine jurisprudence.
Aguinaldo explained, citing Pascual v Hon. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija: “The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. When the people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with the knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of such fault or misconduct, to practically overrule the will of the people.”
The Doctrine of Condonation does not apply to criminal acts committed by the reelected official during his prior or previous term (Ingco v Sanchez, 1967; People v Jalosjos, 2000). Accordingly, the pendency of a criminal case under Republic Act 3019 may be the legal basis for the suspension from office in a subsequent term in the event of an elective official’s reelection (Libanan v Sandiganbayan, 1994). The ruling that a public officer cannot be removed for acts done prior to his present term of office applies only to administrative liabilities committed during the previous term of an elective official. The rationale for the foregoing distinction is that the administrative liability of a public officer is separate and distinct from his penal liability.
There is no condonation in criminal cases as guilt is determined by the courts and not the electorate. The rationale for the noncondonation of the criminal liability was explained in Oliveros v Villaluz.
The condonation of the administrative liability would still be recognized as having been granted during the previous term and the public officer will have no administrative liability during his succeeding term, where the misconduct was committed during the previous term and is continued to be perpetrated during the succeeding term, such as where the assailed retainer agreement was executed during the previous term and the payments for the assailed retainer continued to be paid during the succeeding term (Salalima v Guingona, 1996) or where the assailed contract was signed during the previous term and the deliveries under the contracts were made during the succeeding term (Garcia v Mojica, 1999). The presumption under this jurisprudence is that the two incidents pertain to a single administrative offense. The recourse against the erring official would be through a criminal prosecution.
The condonation would not apply where the offense was committed while the public official was still an appointive official and he had been elected for the first time. The condonation of an administrative offense takes place only when the public official is reelected despite the pendency of an administrative case against him (Ombudsman v Torres, 2008).
A challenge to a preventive suspension order becomes moot and academic upon expiration of the term of office of petitioner and petitioner’s reelection to the same post (Dumlao v Diaz, 1969). Of course, this condonation of misconduct committed during the expired term of the public officer by virtue of his reelection to office for a new term applies only to his administrative and not to his criminal guilt. The condonation would still apply even if the anomalies were discovered, and the administrative complaints were filed only after his reelection. The remedy then would be to file the appropriate civil and criminal actions.
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Atty. Dennis B. Funa is the Insurance Commission’s deputy commissioner for legal services. Send comments to dennisfuna@yahoo.com.
2 comments
It is the electorate’s fault who voted for the corrupt official. They have to deal with that for the rest of their miserable lives
Good discussion on the condonation doctrine which applies in cases as a rule in isolation. However, the doctrine will fail if challenged on constitutional ground simply because the doctrine has no legal legs to stand on – no statute, no law, no constitutional provision which it could be anchored to. As both Sereno and Carpio put it – it is a bad doctrine. A doctrine that will not pass the smell test let alone a constitutional challenge. A doctrine that is affront to and has the potential to lay waste to dozens of statutes and laws that mandate and promote good governance. A doctrine that frustrates the will of the people as it negates and assaults the spirit of the foundational document which is the constitution.
This is the main reason why the doctrine thrived, and will probably continue to do so until reversed by the SC, and was used successfully by the accused, on cases that were either, wittingly or wittingly, prosecuted haphazardly by the Ombudsman’s office in the past. The previous Ombudsman never researched nor challenged the doctrine vis-à-vis the constitution and everybody was led to believe that it was a sound, solid and constitutionally-compliant doctrine. It was not.
Any attempt to discuss and justify this doctrine and attach a legal sound basis of it will unavoidably betray the contextual depth of his/her legal insights and understanding and exposes him/her against accusations of deceptive or distorted view of a legal fiction, regardless of a claim of being politically-neutral perspective.