THE term “Ukrainian crisis” is misleading. After all, we are dealing with Russia’s unprovoked and unjustified military aggression against its neighbor, which is a flagrant violation of the prohibition on the use of force under the Charter of the United Nations.
The federation has broken one of the most fundamental principles of international law by directly threatening European and international security and stability. It is a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and should uphold its charter.
Meanwhile, Russia attacked Ukraine in an attempt to seize land, power and property—as in a colonial-type war. It is clearly interfering with the ongoing democratization process in the besieged country by brutal military aggression and annexing part of its territories. Its actions have the potential to spark a European and global arms race.
The role of sanctions, with their impacts on debt and trade, remain crucial in the broader attempt to stop Vladimir Putin. Russia’s threats to use chemical, biological and even nuclear weapons could lead to heinous acts of violence that make future peace difficult to achieve.
Why war?
TO understand the decision behind it, we must understand Putin’s motivations. In line with the strongman’s thoughts, his country has become a great power not because it achieved great economic or scientific achievements, but that it won a great victory over the Third Reich. However, it was gained through alliance with the United States, Great Britain (as part of the “Big Three”), and the rest of the Allies, including Poland.
Russia strives to restore its status as one of the global powers. By 2014 Russia saw itself in the contemporary “Big Trinity,” along with the US and the European Union (EU). Over time, Moscow was considered the last one subordinate to America as part of the so-called “Collective West,” while China emerged in the capacity of the third main partner of the new world configuration.
In American perception, China became the main rival and threat. On the other hand, the US considered Russia as the main potential rival; and at the same time, a threat. Not without significance in the selection of the moment of armed assault on Ukraine was the fact that the entire Kremlin elite always ached to determine Russia as the power of the second category: a regional power.
Putin was particularly offended when he heard from Barack Obama that Russia has the status of a regional power. The Kremlin recognized this as an attempt to redefine the role of Russia in the world as a state that no longer has to decide on global matters, and plays only a role in its region. A complex of many autocrats and dictators speaks here. They often feel a huge need not only to exercise leadership internally, but also to look for its confirmation in the eyes of the world.
Why Ukraine?
MOSCOW’S decision to target its neighbor results in a much greater extent from the situation in Russia itself than from that in Ukraine. Former US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzeziński believed that Ukraine, subject to Moscow, had been the main condition for the existence of the Russian empire. A democratic Ukraine would end Putin’s dreams of rebuilding such.
During the first governments of Putin, and also in Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency, almost every Russian program and strategic document in their conclusions ended with the need for modernization. After 2012 this word suddenly disappeared from public speeches and documents.
This word was replaced with another concept that has never been spoken loudly: “militarization,” or a straightening of a military-industrial complex. Modernization requires deep reforms, and it would force Moscow to abandon central manual management and bureaucratic control processes, so typical for the former Soviet economy. Modernization in Russia failed, but militarization turned out to be successful. Putin opposed an idea of “vertical power” based on centralized and hierarchical authority implemented by special services, army and other uniformed services, compared to “horizontal power” based on democracy and economic liberalism.
Against the wishes of the Kremlin, Ukraine entered into the formation process of horizontal power: the path of liberal and democratic changes. Ukrainian democracy is still quite weak because of the oligarchizing of power characteristic for almost all former Soviet republics and parts of the countries of the former East Camp.
Nevertheless, the adoption of a democratic model meant that potential chances of regaining control over Ukraine began to drift away from Putin’s hand. In a country that operates according to democratic standards, it is impossible for Moscow to install the “vertical power” system, which could be a minor copy of the Kremlin system. It is an obvious challenge for authoritarian power in Russia and the next reason Putin decided to settle a puppet government in Kiev.
Moreover, he would be ready to defend such power in Ukraine, as he does in Belarus with Aleksandr Lukashenko’s regime. Probably he would be personally happy if he had this kind of “satrap” ruled in Kiev after the end of the “small winning war” that would bring the Russian president another victory in the elections of 2024.
Why now?
RUSSIA has been convinced that it has an advantage in the sphere of the latest technologies. Putin and his surroundings know that Americans will eliminate this advantage soon in the arms race.
In this short window of time, Russia decided to resort to the threat of using nuclear charges against enemies, but Moscow knows that the threat can never be used in practice because both sides want to avoid what was called in the times of the Cold War’s Mutual Assured Destruction. Therefore, this is an advantage used as an element of political blackmail, and not practiced on the battlefield.
Therefore, with pride and sense of triumphalism, Putin and his generals announced that Russia had reached the ability to build hypersonic weapons; that is, technology where a nuclear weapon or a ballistic missile can fly a distance of 5,000 kilometers in just a dozen or 20 minutes. This joy comes from the fact that, for the first time in history, Russia managed to get a strategic advantage over the US and all other countries in the world.
Not without significance in the selection of the moment of aggression were also the assessment of the weaknesses of the Western world leadership: the UN’s system and in particular, the underestimation of the US president and the expectation that the free world would not be unable to demonstrate unity, solidarity, and the ability to quickly make decisions.
Why is aggression popular in Russia?
A MAJORITY of Russians warmly embraced Putin’s demand for “dignity and recognition” of their country as a superpower and his repeated claim that “they will start to respect us again when they [are] afraid.” It gave Putin a green light for the “special operation.”
Overwhelming governmental disinformation and propaganda in Russia—including disturbing information space, brainwashing minds, as well as corrupting human values and principles of the traditional Russian society—remains one of the powerful tools in Russia’s arsenal in justifying the aggression. Its leadership has so “successfully” poisoned the minds of Russians that for many of them, the process of democratization and the pro-European course of Ukraine has become synonymous with “Nazism.”
The Kremlin applies pure military censorship. Russia’s Ministry of Defense is the only one source of information about the military operation of its army in Ukraine. Administrative censorship laws threaten those accused of discrediting the Russian armed forces, or who call for sanctions, with stiff fines followed by jail time up to 15 years in prison. More than 300 Russians have been charged in the past month under those laws that silence critics of Putin’s invasion.
Russians have aspects of identity that they do not like, choosing to reject and repress such to avoid anxiety. The Kremlin uses this defense mechanism in propaganda and disinformation, blaming its own past and present illegal and destructive wrongdoings on other nations. This helps to soothe the remorse of Russians.
What with PHL?
RUSSIA’S war in Ukraine has global repercussions but in the Philippines, there is a natural tendency to see Europe as completely separate areas, because they are far away from the conflict, as it takes place in a cultural space alien from their perspective.
Many politicians still embraced the 19th-Century concept that large states still have the right to have a sphere of influence, and that full independence for smaller units is not a realistic option. They view Ukraine as a rebellious province, because it was a part of the former Soviet Union. However, Europe and Asia are in fact interconnected to such an extent that they often constitute one area, including building and supporting the principles of global order.
In addition, the war in Ukraine is a warning to other countries in the region in the context of potential operations that would be similarly destabilizing and destructive. The next regional strategic concept must reflect this new security reality. It needs to seek connections among the EU, the US and other like-minded partners to face fundamental challenges in the South China Sea/West Philippine Sea (SCS/WPS): those of technological, commercial, political, security and diplomatic dimensions.
Any passivity in condemning Russia’s breach of fundamental principles of global law is a direct threat to security and stability in Asia as well. It creates a very dangerous legal precedent, notably for any assertive power that has repeatedly pushed for its own interpretations of international law, most clearly in the SCS/WPS.
Neutrality is not a political option to comfortably close the eyes when a stronger state aggresses a weaker one. The region’s response to the war in Ukraine showed unprecedented solidarity among the EU, the US, and other partners in Southeast Asia. In the case of Asean countries, these commitments and solidarity are often uncoordinated, and result from individual actions of the countries themselves, but not from the organization as such.
The Philippines has explicitly condemned the invasion of Ukraine. The attitude of the Ukrainians, their incredible hope of freedom and independence in challenging imperialism of greater power, inspires many Filipinos. The personal charisma of President Volodymyr Zeleńskyy even echoes those of Jose Rizal.