When it rains, it pours. From not having any idea what the proposed changes to the 1987 Constitution would be, we are now deluged by at least three separate versions of the planned amendments. With so many proposals to wade through and study thoroughly, it’s a wonder that anyone still thinks that the best time for a plebiscite is in May 2018. Of course, if Congress—that is to say both the House of Representatives and the Senate—decrees that such a plebiscite take place in May anyway, it’s difficult to imagine the Commission on Elections (Comelec) shirking its responsibility. However, that would be like fitting a square peg in a round hole—it can be made to work, sure, but it’ll be a terrible fit. Which is a shame, because some proposals—particularly those dealing with suffrage and the Comelec—are not bad at all.
Perhaps, the most mainstream of all the proposals I’ve read so far is the removal of the Comelec’s quasi-judicial function. In a culture where more is typically considered better, this idea may seem radical —at some point, some will even say that it’s “a slap on the face” for the Comelec. But it isn’t though. In fact, it makes perfect sense and it has been proposed many times before, sometimes even by people who went on to become Comelec commissioners themselves.
In contrast, the most objectionable proposal I’ve come across (with regard to the Comelec anyway) is the move to do away with a national (or federal) level Comelec, while having each region (or state) establish its own electoral management body (EMB). All elections would then be administered at the local or state level.
The problem with this idea is that, without a federal Comelec, the state-level EMBs will be particularly vulnerable to hijacking by the local power structures, which are preeminent during the period of federation. This will perpetuate an imbalance of political power within the state, and might, very conceivably, predispose to electoral fraud. At the very least, this state of affairs will provide a fertile breeding ground for distrust in the electoral system. And, with lines of accountability practically non-existent in the absence of a higher authority (i.e., a federal Comelec), fostering public confidence that the elections are not, in some way, rigged by the incumbent powers becomes very difficult.
On a more technical level, having no federal Comelec to prescribe performance benchmarks, ensure uniform technical proficiency and enforce technology standards across the federated states will inevitably lead to wildly varying levels of election-management quality from state to state. Again, this will only make it that much easier for local power structures to co-opt the electoral system in their own backyard, while effectively holding the Federal Parliament (whatever we end up calling it) hostage to potentially dynastic interests.
In the final analysis, and regardless of the move to federalism, there must remain a strong and independent national-level Comelec to which, and from which, the lines of accountability must be clearly and definitively drawn, and to act as a professional hub that sets standards for electoral management.