I am privileged to be attending the Annual Meeting of Legal Advisers of the International Committee of the Red Cross/Red Crescent Societies, representing the Philippine Red Cross. Of interest to the more than 100 Legal Advisers representing their respective National Societies is the universal issue of Violent Extremism. I am sharing hereunder a background paper of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on the subject.
“PVE and CVE stand respectively for Preventing Violent Extremism and Countering Violent Extremism.”
There is no internationally agreed definition of “violent
extremism.” In P/CVE theory it is generally described as the way people come to
embrace “radical” views and ideas that can lead to violent action, which may be
inspired by or linked to groups and/or individuals described as “terrorists.”
The dominant but contested theory of violent extremism focuses on social and
political grievances (e.g., poverty, marginalization, lack of professional
opportunities, political oppression and perceived injustices) that can be
exploited to persuade individuals to support or commit to ideologically
motivated violence in order to further
political goals.
While counterterrorism generally refers to the coercive measures States use to tackle “terrorism” (e.g., policing and judicial measures, blocking of financing, preventive detention, counterinsurgency campaigns and targeted air strikes), P/CVE is the use of noncoercive means to prevent or dissuade individuals or groups from adopting “extremist views” that might lead to act of terrorism. P/CVE is thus intimately related to and part of States’ broader counter-terrorism agenda.
Owing to the lack of an agreed definition of violent extremism— and the broad and contested range of push and pull factors that P/CVE initiates aim to address—a variety of concerns have been expressed about the impact of P/CVE programs. These include the risk of stigmatizing some communities considered as vulnerable to violent extremism based on ethnicity, religion or race; the criminalization of individuals suspected of being “radicalized” in the absence of any unlawful acts; and the suppression of legitimate political opposition groups.
States’ understanding that terrorism must be fought through more than military or security means is not new. Noncoercive and preventive measures to address this phenomenon have been part of counter-insurgency strategies and counter-terrorism approaches for decades (e.g., the famous “winning hearts and minds” approaches).
The concept of P/CVE as it is now understood emerged more than 10 years ago in the post-9/11 context out of concerns to address the root causes of terrorism. However, high-level and global interest in P/CVE has peaked in recent years because of the rise and spread of violent armed groups that claim to follow a particular “jihadist” ideology. Increasing attacks in various countries—including by States’ own citizens in some cases—and the phenomenon of “foreign fighters” have made P/CVE a security priority for States, as illustrated by the United States’s White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism in February 2015.
In January 2016, the United Nations secretary-general (UNSG) unveiled a Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism and called upon all States to develop national plans on PVE. The plan aims to tackle PVE through a comprehensive, “all-of-UN” approach that requires all UN agencies, funds and programs to contribute to preventing this phenomenon across all three pillars of the UN’s mandate: peace and security, development and human rights.
There are currently no agreements or understanding at the
global level on the drivers for violent extremism and the most effective means
to address them—a point acknowledged in the UNSG’s plan of action. Some States
have even resisted this agenda, preferring a more traditional counterterrorism
approach. Nevertheless, due to the current political momentum, many countries
are developing and implementing national plans based on their own assessment
and
understanding.
P/CVE aims to tackle factors that both push and pull individuals to violent extremism. P/CVE strategies are primarily driven by State authorities and include a wide range of activities ultimately aimed at preventing acts of violence or the reoccurrence of such acts. Given the broad range of factors they aim to address, P/CVE approaches share some strategies similar to development, conflict prevention and peace-building efforts, such as: setting up social inclusion programs; promoting a peaceful and tolerant society; engaging in cross-community dialogue; and reducing poverty and inequalities.
International organizations and various civil-society actors
are being asked to partner with State authorities in designing or implementing
P/CVE plans of action, which usually have a “whole-of-society” approach that
requires the involvement of all sectors and actors. These may include
civil-society organizations, the private sector, UN agencies, peacekeeping
operations, development NGOs and humanitarian actors, depending on the
environment and the activity.
P/CVE activities may include, among others:
• Development programs for education, job creation and inclusion; community engagement activities, especially with young people, aimed at fostering social cohesion, promoting democratic culture and dialogue, and providing economic and livelihood opportunities; and strengthening the capacity of governments to deliver services and security, and to ensure the rule of law and respect for human rights.
• De-radicalization programs targeting individuals or groups at risk or already involved in “radical” movements or organizations. These are typically carried out in prison environments, and may include scholars engaging in religious and ideological debate with detainees. Special de-radicalization facilities may be built or detainees may be segregated within prisons, based on perceived “radicalization.”
• Training and/or revised responsibilities for police and armed forces. In some parts of the world, national counterterrorism forces or units are requesting specific training on the use of force and legal standards in strategies to reduce “violent extremism.”
• Countering “extremist” propaganda and voices on social media and in communities by promoting “moderate” voices or the voices of victims of acts of terrorism.
• Monitoring and intelligence-gathering activities targeting communities considered vulnerable to “extremist” views. Community groups, police, peacekeeping operations and even teachers or health personnel may be involved.
Whatever measures our own government adopts moving forward,
what is important in promoting lasting peace is not merely eliminating violent
extremism but addressing our people’s social and political grievances—poverty,
marginalization, perceived injustices, inclusive economic reforms and respect
for the rule of law. Noncoercive and preventive measures to address violent
extremism and terrorism (the “winning hearts and minds” approach) might be the
solutions this
government needs.