WHAT is the best approach for the United States to the South China Sea issue? This was asked by global security expert, retired Admiral James Stavridis, former supreme allied commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and dean of the Flecher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.
“This tense situation is out in the open, and President Xi’s September 2015 visit to Washington, and President Trump’s trip to Asia in 2017, did not fundamentally change anything,” he said in his best-selling book Sea Power, an exemplary and contemporary history and geopolitics of the world’s oceans.
“First, despite provocations, the United States must maintain open communications with China and seek ways to reduce the chances of an inadvertent collision between the United States and China [unlikely] or between China and one of its neighbors [far more unlikely]. The US relationship with China encompasses economic issues, geopolitical cooperation from Afghanistan to Iran, and global environmental issue—the South China Sea dispute is only one element. Dialogue is crucial. And the agreement on military-to-military contact and cybersecurity that the two presidents discussed during Xi’s visit are better than nothing.
“Second, the United States needs to strengthen its relationship with existing allies and partners in the region and encourage them to work together better. This applies especially to Japan and South Korea, which, for a host of historical reasons, have long had an uncomfortable relationship. The United States can help build better ties between the two neighbors by promoting military exchanges and exercises, enabling conversations at important events like the Shangri-La Dialogue [an annual gathering of strategic thinkers in Singapore], and encouraging so-called Tract II engagement, which are exchanges and dialogue conducted not through government channels [Tract I] but instead through academic and research institutions. The Trans-Pacific Partnership, a massive multilateral trade agreement, is a big element: building a network of even stronger trading ties can ensure that America’s friends and allies cooperate with one another. And in particular, working more closely with Vietnam makes good sense—and this should include lifting bans on weapons sales.
“Third, the fundamental tenets of international law are against China’s approach in the South China Sea. The United States should sternly emphasize this in international forums like the United Nations, the G-7 and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. The intellectual underpinnings of international legal judgments on the South China Sea are very clear: nations cannot simply declare “ historical claim” and take over what other nations regard as international waters. The United States, as a global maritime power, should not miss any opportunity to object. The recent negative ruling against China further buttresses this strategic approach. And frankly, the United States should finally sign the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the treaty that governs the world’s oceans, to maintain the high ground in these conversations.
“Fourth, and finally, the United States should exercise its rights of transit under international legal norms: its Freedom of Navigation operations. That means overflying Chinese territorial claims and sailing US ships through China’s claimed water space—the waters within 12 miles of these islands. The United States has a long tradition of countering unjustified historical claims by sailing and flying through international waters and airspace. Now is the time to exercise it in the South China Sea.”
According to Stavridis, none of these strategic prescriptions by themselves will resolve the challenges of the South China Sea. Nor will simply moving US military aircraft and vessels through claimed Chinese air and sea space suffice.
“Pushing back on Chinese claims in the South China Sea requires a broader strategy that treats this violation of the international law and the larger context of both Chinese behavior and Sino-US relations. Above all, it will require US leadership alongside America’s many partners and friends through East Asia. China’s Great Wall was at least partially successful in keeping foreigners out. The Great Wall of Sand will not be,” Stavridis stressed.
“Unfortunately,” he said, “we are merely at the start of an entirely predictable and dangerous arms race as nations in the region increasingly respond both to the perception of a rising military power in China that seems more assertive in a strategic sense and in growing evidence of instability on the Korean Peninsula.”
“All of this happened as the American ‘Pacific Pivot’ [President Obama’s rebalancing foreign policy initiative in East Asia and the Pacific] failed to gain traction in the face of crisis in Syria, threats from the Islamic State, an ongoing tension with Russia over Ukraine, and the Trump administration’s isolationist instincts,” Stavridis pointed out.
“Overall,” said the global security expert, “the South China Sea will be a hinge upon which huge geopolitical issues will ultimately swing. The United States must consider it a crucial zone of maritime activity in the 21st century. If we cede it to China—something China deeply desires and would consider inevitable—our global strategy will fail. While we should not push ourselves into a cold war with a rising China, we need to be mindful of our values and the importance of international law.”
To reach the writer, e-mail cecilio.arillo@gmail.com.