IN 2012 the Commission on Elections ceased the production of voter identification cards, in anticipation of the creation of a National Identification System. Early discussions on the national ID indicated that it could be used as a voter ID. This potentially represented a radical change of Comelec philosophy from an earlier attempt to create a national ID, the Unified Multi-Purpose ID or UMID.
The UMID is a four-in-one identification card that Filipinos can use to transact with government agencies such as the Social Security System, Government Service Insurance System, PhilHealth and Pag-IBIG Fund. Being a government-issued ID, the UMID is accepted as valid in practically all transactions. At the time of its creation, attempts were made to include the Comelec and its database of more than 40 million voters. The Comelec demurred, however, averring correctly that its authority to gather private information was strictly limited to voter registration purposes. Consequently, the UMID was created without the Comelec and the voter ID dodged the obsolescence that had been predicted for it.
When the national ID was proposed in the late-2010s, therefore, it did come as something of a surprise that its proponents were hinting at the new system replacing the voter ID. At that time, it remained unclear how this was to be achieved. However, as no representations were made to enfold the Comelec database into the national ID database, and since the potential benefits of having just one universal ID card were significant, the decision was made to hedge against redundancy and simply suspend the issuance of voter IDs.
With the recent emergence of the national ID law, two questions immediately arose: What is the relationship between the national ID system and the Comelec’s database of voter information? And will the national ID card, as expected, actually replace the Comelec voter ID? As it turns out, the answers seem to be “nothing,” and “no.”
To put it very simply, it now appears that the Comelec will only act as a registration point for persons wishing to be issued a national ID—only one of several, in fact. Early discussions indicate that data-capturing machines will be provided to the Comelec, to be used exclusively for national ID registration. This makes sense as the biometrics gathered by the national ID system are not the same as those gathered by the Comelec.
And while these machines will be located at Comelec offices nationwide, national ID personnel will man them. In other words, the Comelec database will not be used, and the Comelec will not be relieved of the responsibility of gathering the biometrics of persons wanting to register as voters.
Which brings us to the next question: Will the national ID replace the voter ID? Not in any significant way. The ID’s intrinsic limitations—such as that specifically provided for in Section 14, of RA 1105—severely limit its role as a “passport” for the services of other government agencies. Not to put too fine a point on it, it now appears that the national ID will simply be an additional form of government-issued ID, begging the question why do it at all?
It is quite possible—although I would be venturing into the realm of speculation here—that the true value of the national ID is in how it can be integrated into future services. One possible application, for instance, is as an access point for special price-controlled retail outlets where individual registered users can be assigned a quota of cheaply priced commodities. And then, of course, there is the law-enforcement angle. With an established national ID system in place, a future where individual access to telecommunications services can be easily regulated, individual mobility recorded in minute detail, and fruits of criminal activity be denied to the criminal actors.
None of which, of course, the voter ID can do now anyway. So here’s another question: will the Comelec resume printing voter IDs? Or has that little blue card already irretrievably gone the way of dinosaurs?
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ON a final note: It didn’t take long for people to change their tune about premature campaigning. As soon as they had skin in the game, people who had been critical about early posters and campaign activities began promoting their own candidates with equal—and equally premature—zeal. In the process, they trot out their justifications and rationalizations, providing themselves a comfortable place to sit in. If nothing else, this tendency is probably the single biggest reason for the delay in plugging the loophole: people judge others by their actions, and themselves by their intent.