REPUBLIC Act (RA) 10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 (cybercrime law), was approved on September 12, 2012. The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of the cyberspace, a system that accommodates millions and billions of simultaneous and ongoing individual accesses to and uses of the Internet.
Cyberspace satisfies the insatiable need of the millennial generation for greater information and facility of communication. Using his laptop or computer, a person can connect to the Internet, a system that links him or her to other computers and enables him, among other things, to access virtual libraries and encyclopedias for all kinds of information; post billboard-like notices or messages, including pictures and videos, for the general public or for special audiences; advertise and promote goods or services and make purchases and payments; inquire and do business with institutional entities; communicate in writing or by voice with any person through his e-mail address or telephone.
But, as pointed out by Supreme Court (SC) Justice Roberto A. Abad in Disini v. Secretary of Justice (GR 203335, February 11, 2014), all is not well with the system, since it cannot filter out a number of persons of ill will who would want to use cyberspace technology for mischiefs and crimes. One of them can, for instance, avail himself or herself of the system to unjustly ruin the reputation of another or bully the latter by posting defamatory statements against him that people can read. A person’s image will instantly be tarnished by just one click of the mouse or of the “send” button.
And because linking with the Internet opens up a user to communications from others, the ill-motivated can use the cyberspace for committing theft by hacking into, or surreptitiously accessing, his bank account or credit card, or defrauding him through false representations. The wicked can use the cyberspace, too, for illicit trafficking in sex or for exposing to pornography guileless children who have access to the Internet.
Vandals, who just want to wreck or cause havoc to the computer systems and networks of indispensable or highly useful institutions, accomplish this by sending electronic viruses or virtual dynamites that destroy those computer systems, networks, programs and memories. The government certainly has the duty and the right to prevent these from happening and punish their perpetrators, hence the Cybercrime Prevention Act.
Several petitions were filed in the SC, claiming that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating undesirable cyberspace activities violate certain constitutional rights. The government asserted that the law merely seeks to reasonably put order into cyberspace activities, punish wrongdoings and prevent hurtful attacks on the system.
Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of the provisions of the cybercrime law that regard certain acts as crimes and impose penalties for their commission, as well as provisions that would enable the government to track down and penalize violators. These provisions are on Illegal Access; Data Interference; Cyber-squatting; Identity Theft; Cybersex; Child Pornography; Unsolicited Commercial Communications; and Libel.
Specifically, the petitioners dispute the constitutionality of both the Revised Penal Code (RPC) provisions on libel, as well as Section 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act on cyberlibel.
Article 353 of the RPC defines libel as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.
The libel provision of the cybercrime law, on the other hand, merely incorporates the provisions of the RPC on libel. Thus, Section 4(c)(4) provides that cyberlibel is libel (as defined by the RPC) committed through a computer system or any other similar means that may be devised in the future.
The SC in the Disini case held that libel is not a constitutionally protected speech, and that the government has an obligation to protect private individuals from defamation. Indeed, cyberlibel is actually not a new crime, since Article 353 of the RPC already punishes it. In effect, Section 4(c)(4) above merely affirms that online defamation constitutes “similar means” for committing libel. The SC ruled that only the original author (blogger) should be penalized for the libelous article, blog or statement, noting that the culture associated with Internet media is distinct from that of print
According to the 2011 Southeast Asia Digital Consumer Report, cited in Disini v. Secretary of Justice (supra), 33 percent of Filipinos have accessed the Internet within a year, translating to about 31 million users. Based on a recent survey, the Philippines ranks sixth in the Top 10 most engaged countries for social networking. Social-networking sites build social relations among people who, for example, share interests, activities, backgrounds, or real-life connections.
In the cyberworld, there are many actors: a) the blogger, who originates the assailed statement; b) the blog service provider, like Yahoo; c) the Internet service provider, like PLDT, Smart, Globe, or Sun; d) the Internet café that may have provided the computer used for posting the blog; e) the person who makes a favorable comment on the blog; and f) the person who posts a link to the blog site. Should the blogger post a malicious and defamatory statement on social networking, like “President DU30 is concealing a life-threatening cancer,” and a reader and his friends and fellows avail themselves of any of the “Like”, “Comment” and “Share” reactions, would they be guilty of aiding and abetting libel?
The SC in the Disini case stressed that, except for the original author of the assailed statement, the rest (those who pressed Like, Comment and Share) are essentially knee-jerk sentiments of readers who may think little or haphazardly of their response to the original posting are not liable for aiding and abetting libel. The SC also considered the inherent impossibility of joining hundreds or thousands of responding “friends” or “followers” in the criminal charge to be filed in court.
In sum, the SC in the Disini case declared that Section 4(c)(4) of RA 10175, the cybercrime law, that penalizes online libel, is valid and constitutional, with respect to the original author of the post; but void and unconstitutional, with respect to others who simply receive the post and react to it.
The implementing rules and Regulations of RA 10175 reiterated the pronouncement made in the Disini case by the SC that in cases of Internet libel, only the original author of the post or online libel may be held liable and not the others who simply receive the post and react to it. The penalty for cyberlibel is prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, or a fine ranging from P6,000 up to the maximum amount determined by the Court, or both, in addition to the civil action that may be brought by the offended party. Under the cybercrime law, the penalty for online libel is one degree higher compared with print libel.
Indeed, the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances. The lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, the malicious, the insulting, the angry and fighting works—which by their very utterance inflict injury, foment dispute, tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace—are all forms of expression not protected by our Constitution. And if done in cyberspace, where reputations can be tainted and damaged with just one click, it is right that the penalty should be stiffer than traditional libel.