Donald J. Trump’s surprise election last November is, perhaps, the most significant political upheaval of 2016, with far-reaching impact on Asean’s 10 members—Brunei Darus-salam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.
Without doubt, Trump has yet to reveal the specifics of his foreign policy toward the Asean. His “America first” campaign rhetoric and subsequent behavior cast doubts on whether America’s Asian pivot will continue—let alone prosper—under a Trump presidency.
Serious questions also linger on how adept President Trump will be in handling diplomatic relations, illustrated by a congratulatory phone call from Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen that immediately earned the ire of Beijing officials.
The US president-elect then openly questioned the US’s “One China” policy of considering Taiwan as part of mainland China, a cornerstone of US-Sino relations for nearly four decades. He said in a TV interview that the US does not have to be bound to this policy, unless part of a future deal with China covering other things, including trade. Chinese state media have since said the One China policy is not up for negotiation.
Such uninformed behavior appears to be eroding US credibility, even driving Asean members straight into the arms of China. Of course, some in Asean have long been on China’s side, even before Trump’s election.
But what appears to be pushing even longtime US allies to China’s side are Trump’s protectionist views on free trade.
A particular point of contention is his vocal opposition to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)—the complex free-trade deal that covers 12 nations (four of which are Asean members) roughly accounting for 40 percent of global GDP. Negotiations for the TPP lasted for a decade, as it was seen as a keystone to President Barack Obama’s Asian pivot and a boon for Asean’s export-driven economies.
Trump won on a platform that tapped into the American working class’ anger with free-trade policies—like the TPP—that shipped out to countries with cheap labor like those in Asean tens of thousands of blue-collar jobs in the United States.
After his victory, Trump posted a message saying that he will issue a notification of intent to withdraw from the TPP, describing the deal as “a potential disaster” for the United States. He said that, instead, he will push for bilateral trade deals that ensure that the jobs once shipped out will return to the US.
Around the same time, after staunchly advocating TPP, Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc announced that Vietnam’s legislature would no longer ratify the agreement on account of political changes in the US. Officials have since said they will pursue alternative deals, following an economic agenda built on achieving prosperity via trade.
Malaysian Trade Minister Mustapa Mohamed similarly said that, as the possible collapse of the TPP looms, his country will focus on wrapping up negotiations on other multination trade pacts.
Trump’s announcement, coupled with US lawmakers’ widespread apprehension about the TPP, scuttled the deal’s prospects. It also opened even wider the opportunity for China to push its Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)—a trade deal which covers all of Asean but markedly excludes the US—and its “One Belt, One Road” initiative as alternatives.
In fact, Chinese President Xi Jinping did just that during the recent Apec forum in Lima, where participating leaders vowed to fight any form of protectionism.
These developments, with a growing membership in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) that now includes all of Asean, points to the realization of China’s long-term dream of having the entire Southeast Asian region under its sphere of influence. And while many factors have been at play to bring Asean closer to Beijing, Trump’s triumph may just have provided the turning point.
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