Part Two
AS the late Sen. and Foreign Affairs Secretary Blas F. Ople once said, many of the leftist insurgents, Moro separatists and rebel officers in the military and police organizations supported then-Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in the Edsa II power grab. “Thus, they claimed the right to give advice to President Arroyo as members of her political alliance.”
Some of the American observers who quietly visited the country in 2002 were wondering why the President excluded the leftists as targets in her 14-point antiterrorism agenda submitted to the Senate and the House when, on record, they killed more Americans than the Abu Sayyaf and MILF combined in the past.
Subsequently, President Arroyo also issued 100 safe-conduct passes to top members of the leftist organization and unilaterally declared a cease-fire that jeopardized ongoing military operations and further exposed the country to security risk.
The functions and responsibilities of the police and military are not clearly delineated and prioritized, and it, thus, compounds the problem.
The job to eradicate the root causes of insurgency and criminality belongs largely to local executives, but they often received only lip service, having no operational command and control over the men in uniform although they are at the frontlines of the peace and order campaign and the guerrilla war in the countryside, as well as in the urban areas.
As a result, civilian and military authorities often end up repeating the old pattern of buck-passing, finger-pointing and scapegoating every time a violent situation occurs. The Mamasapano incident, where 44 Special Action Force commandos were massacred by separatist rebels, was a perfect case in point.
Worse, there is no agreed means by which the people and policy-makers can gauge the overall capabilities and performance of the men in uniform.
For instance, former AFP Chiefs of Staff Gen. Gregorio Catapang and Gen. Diomedio Villanueva promised that the military would settle the Abu Sayyaf problem and stifle insurgency and separatism before the end of their terms. In her time, President Arroyo also bragged, “isang bala lang kayo,” referring to the Abu Sayyaf.
Clearly, those who anticipated spectacular battlefield victories were, and still are, not familiar with the way the enemies operate, and will undoubtedly be disappointed at the outcome of the war. For instance, the classic guerrilla tactic of the Abu Sayyaf and its extensive support structure from the Moro population, the Moro Islamic Liberation and the Moro National Liberation Front, makes it an elusive and difficult target even for military and police organizations not suffering from lack of funds, a tactical and strategic direction and a defective command structure.
On the problem of military rebellion, the point for criticism against the military and police organizations was not only the lack of loyalty or fidelity to the Constitution, but also the failure of leadership to unify and discipline the ranks.
Other related problems:
- A timid, corrupt or muzzled press, as well as corrupt and incompetent public official, are unwitting allies of insurgents.
- The best form of public or civil relations by the armed forces in an insurgency situation is concrete direction and responsible governance, not press releases or cheap gimmickry.
- The men in uniform, as well as those in the civilian bureaucracy, must live within the broad spectrum of the country’s economic constraints and other limitations.
- The country’s national security and public safety interest is paramount and it must not be compromised in favor of the enemies for any form of expediency, including blackmail and endless negotiations.
The paradox is that the more united and cohesive the armed services, the fewer the threat to national security and public safety or no threat at all. The more inchoate and divided they are, the more violent challenges to the State occur.
To be continued
To reach the writer, e-mail cecilio.arillo@gmail.com.