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Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) is eerily quiet on how much
in “money lifeline” it has extended to Bankwise before
it decided to close down the thrift bank which is said
to have P1.3 billion in deposit liabilities.
After
all, it can thank its lucky stars that the ongoing focus
on the broadband controversy can afford the banking
regulator to take it easy with nary a word on how
insolvent Bankwise is. This, after more than a year of
letting the thrift bank go about seeking a supposed
white knight, ostensibly that of Philippine Veterans
Bank (PVB).
After
coming out with a terse circular on Bankwise’s closure
for being insolvent, the Bangko Sentral has yet to
announce to the depositing public how much in public
funds had been dissipated; one estimate from a bank
analyst put it at more than P2 billion. If the P1.3
billion in deposit liabilities that would have to be
paid by Philippine Deposit Insurance Corp. (PDIC) is to
be included, that means a whopping P3.3-billion losses
in government money.
BSP, in
keeping with its corporate- governance standards and
transparency, should tell the depositing public how the
thrift bank ended up being insolvent. Was it run to the
ground by its officers? How? Were there unsound banking
practices that occurred as to allow a supposedly
loss-free business to wallow in red ink? After all, the
banking business—with its no-cost deposits on checking
accounts and up to 5 percent in interest paid to savings
accounts and time deposits against its lending rates of
between 11 percent and 18 percent—is a profitable
business model.
The
estimate of P3.3 billion in losses for the government
that a bank analyst reckons from the closure of Bankwise
hews closely to the lifeline that the PVB sought from
PDIC for its takeover bid on Bankwise. The bank asked,
but was rebuffed, for P3.5 billion from PDIC for its
supposed white- knight role in Bankwise. The late PDIC
president Michael Osmeña turned down the importuning of
PVB, and the closure proved him right.
More
than five years ago, Bankwise reported no investments in
government securities. It also got P700 million in
advances from the Bangko Sentral while there were
reports swirling around in the banking industry that the
bank got a huge, clean loan from another financial
institution. Has the BSP failed in flagging down the
inherent risks in the way the bank was being managed? Or
did it gloss over the infractions that were apparent due
to the possible entry of another government bank, PVB,
into the picture?
For all
we know, the Bangko Sentral pumped in more money after
the P700 million in advances it initially placed. There
is no way of knowing this in much the same way that
there is no accurate way of telling how the banks are
faring in their management of UITFs (unit investment
trust funds) in the light of the debacle in the stock
market, the ups and downs of the bond market and the
subprime mess that has engulfed the US banking industry.
Was the
banking industry hurt, too, by the subprime mess?
Remember that financial institutions such as banks, as
part of their diversification thrust, could invest their
funds in collateral debt obligations (CDOs) or what
passed for investment-grade debt papers that had, as
underlying assets, packaged financial instruments which
lumped together the debt notes of so-called subprime
borrowers buying housing units. The CDOs had a blowout,
and with it, blue-chip US banks.
The
possibility of a huge loss from the subprime mess for
the local banking industry was earlier asked of a Bangko
Sentral official. This was prompted by the
unaccounted-for P5 billion in net worth in the banking
industry for the period up to September last year. We
understand that the local banking industry’s net income
for the nine-month period stood at P5.5 billion,
compared with the end-2006 period. However, the net
worth of the banking industry rose only by a paltry P500
million.
Where
did the P5 billion go? This we asked from a Bangko
Sentral official. And we were promised the answer.
Unfortunately, the P5 billion which has not been
accounted for has yet to be properly addressed. It would
be difficult to surmise that the P5 billion could have
resulted from losses arising from the subprime mess. It
is also just as difficult to pin down the reasons for
the insolvency of Bankwise as it is similarly
problematic to determine how long the money woes of the
bank has been festering.
But why
did the Bangko Sentral extend that initial lifeline of
P700 million to Bankwise, at a time when its deposits
were at P2 billion as per its financials then? It would
seem that the P700 million evaporated on top of another
P700 million since its deposit liabilities turned out to
be just P1.3 billion when it was closed down. What was
the collateral that Bankwise used in getting that P700
million at a time when it had no investments in
government securities, also as per its financials?
How the
Bankwise story will unravel is a difficult call at a
time of pronouncements from the Bangko Sentral that all
is well in the banking industry, with the ratios well
within the acceptable limits and the nonperforming loans
being addressed aggressively. But the BSP should not let
its guard down and be caught unawares again by another
Bankwise scenario, where it extended a lifeline that
went down the drain, akin to having good money chasing
bad money.
E-mail: hugagni@yahoo.com |